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EUROPEAN VERSUS US UNEMPLOYMENT: DIFFERENT
RESPONSES TO INCREASED DEMAND FOR SKILL?
R. Jackman, R. Layard, M. Manacorda and B. Petrongolo
According to Paul Krugman, “the European unemployment
problem and the US inequality problem are two sides of the same coin”
(Krugman, 1994).1  This is now the conventional wisdom.  According
to this view, there has been a universal shift in the demand for labour
in favour of those with more skill, but countries differ in their wage
flexibility.  In the US which has flexible wages, relative wages have
adjusted; in Europe, which has inflexible wages, the impact has been
on relative employment rates.  In consequence, unemployment in the
US has not risen since the 1970s, while in Europe it has soared.
Is this really the reason why European unemployment has risen?
Obviously it could be.  But in fact there is no evidence that it is.  For
example one implication of the Krugman hypothesis is that, when
relative wages are rigid, the shift in demand should lead to a rise in
unskilled unemployment but a fall in the unemployment of skilled
workers.  But one of the most striking facts about Europe is that skilled
unemployment rose as much as unskilled unemployment (in
proportional terms).  In fact it is only in the US that there is a clear
upward trend in unskilled relative to skilled unemployment.  So there
is a lot to be cleared up.
The purpose of this paper is to develop and apply a framework for
explaining the movement of skilled and unskilled unemployment rates -
and thus of the total unemployment rate.  We first develop in Section
1 a model of skill-specific unemployment, which involves a demand
function and a wage-response function, with supply treated as
exogenous.  From this we derive a framework for decomposing changes
in aggregate unemployment, so as to isolate the effects of differential
shifts in the relative demand and supply of skill.  This then enables us
to show how far changes in unemployment were due to increases in
“skills mismatch”.
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In Section 2 we apply this framework in detail to the changes in
skill-specific unemployment in Britain and the US.  We then extend the
analysis to cover most of the main European countries as well, using a
more short-cut framework of analysis.  Section 3 summarises our
conclusions.
1.   THE FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS
Skill-specific unemployment
We begin by analysing skill-specific unemployment. We
concentrate on a binary division between two groups, skilled (group 1)
and unskilled (group 2), though the approach can be generalised.  
The demand side comes from a Cobb-Douglas production
function, which we show later is supported by the evidence.  Thus
where Y is output and Ni is employment.  Thus we can immediately see
the dilemma motivating the Krugman analysis.  For 
where B denotes the term in brackets.  Changes in B reflect shifts in the
demand for skill relative to its supply.  Over time a rises relentlessly,
and if L1 does not rise enough B rises.  This must then lead to either
widening inequality of wages (W2/W1 down) or falls in the relative
employment rate of the unskilled (N2/L2 down relative to N1/L1) - or
both.
But to gain any serious insight into what is happening, we must
focus first on the separate market for each type of skill.  For skilled
labour, demand is given by
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where W1 is the real wage.  Differentiating and then adding and
subtracting (1-a)d log (L1/L2) gives2
At the same time skilled wages respond to skilled employment
according to the double-log wage formation relationship3
or
Combining (1) and (2) gives
where By analogyf 1'u1 / (?% (1&a)u1/ (1&u1)).
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where f 2'u2 / (?%au2/ (1&u2)).
One key lesson emerges at once from (3) and (4) taken together.
The unemployment rates of both groups will be constant, with
du1=du2=0, if
(i) there is no change in B - the balance between relative demand
and relative supply, and
(ii) the wage functions of each group move up by an amount equal
to d logA% log(N1/N2)da.
If however B changes, the unemployment rates will shift, unless the
wage functions adjust appropriately so as to offset this effect.
Going on, it is illuminating to divide the second (bracketed) term
in each equation into two parts, one reflecting shifts in the average
wage function and the other shifts in the relative wage function.  If
we can writedz¯'adz1% (1&a)dz2
5du1'&f 1 (1&a)d logB% f 1 (dz1&dz¯ )% f 1 (d AWP)
% f 1 (1&a)(1&u2)
&1du2 (3')
du2' f 2a d logB% f 2 (dz2&dz¯ )% f 2 (d AWP)% f 2a(1&u1)
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Here AWP refers to aggregate wage pressure, while (dz1-dGz) and (dz2-
dGz) reflect shifts in the relative wage function: if one is positive, the
other is negative.
If we insert these changes into (3) and (4), we can get some real
insight into what is going on.  We have
We can now see how the relative wage functions have to shift if B
changes, in order to prevent unemployment changing.  Thus we can
restate more generally the conditions for constant unemployment rates
(du1, du2=0).  The rates are constant if
(i) which also implies anddz1&dz¯' (1&a)d logB, dz2&dz¯'&ad logB,
(ii) d AWP'dz¯&d logA& log(N1/N2)da '0.
The wage functions must shift to offset the change in imbalance, and
there must be no change in aggregate wage pressure.
Aggregate unemployment
We can now look at the change in aggregate unemployment, du.
To get this, we solve (3') and (4') to get the reduced form equations for
du1 and du2 and then take a weighted average, allowing also for the
compositional shift.  Thus the change, du, includes a compositional
effect, as well as effects from d log B, (dz1-dGz), (dz 2-dGz), and d AWP:
(imbalance shock)du'?1d logB
6(relative wage shock)
%?2(dz1&dz¯ )
%?3(dz2&dz¯ )
(aggregate wage shock)%?4d AWP
(compositional effect) (5)% (u1&u2)d (L1/L)
where the ?is are defined in Annex 1.  There are analogous equations
which determine du1 and du2, also shown in Annex 1.  In our empirical
analysis we therefore show the breakdown of du, du1 and du2 for both
Britain and the US into the categories identified in equation (5).  
This seems a reasonable breakdown.  If unemployment rates
change and there has been no altered balance between relative demand
and supply, then in the most general sense the change in
unemployment must result from changes in wage behaviour at given
unemployment rates.  The changes in wage behaviour will in turn
reflect all kinds of changes - in unemployment benefits, wage
bargaining behaviour, taxes, import prices and so on.  But if our focus
is on the issue of skills imbalance, it is natural to group all the other
issues together under the heading of wage pressure.
But are our definitions of “neutrality” appropriate with respect to
either imbalance or wage pressure?
(i) We define a neutral shift in demand and supply as one in which
there is no change in  anda
1&a
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(ii) We define a neutral change in wage behaviour as one where the
wage function shifts by d log A+log (N1/N2 ) da.
The first point is that if we redefined one of these criteria of
neutrality, we should have to redefine the other, in order to ensure that
there was no effect on unemployment if both changes were neutral.
But how reasonable is each definition, taken on its own?
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(i) A neutral shift in demand and supply.  For neutrality we require
By contrast, others have required4
Frequently however the latter approach can give rise to paradox since
in the historical statistics it is often the case that (d log a-d log L1/L)
and its converse (d log (1-a)-d log L2/L) have the same sign.  The
imbalance appears to have moved in the same direction for both skill-
groups.  That is why these studies so easily yield wild estimates of the
effect of altered imbalances.  Our definition ensures that, if the relative
demand for the skilled increases relative to their supply, the opposite
is true of the unskilled.
(ii) A neutral shift in wage pressure.  Our definition allows wage
pressure at given unemployment to grow at the same rate as the average
wage would grow if there were no change in the composition of
employment.5  Of course if the composition of the labour force is
changing due to rising L1/L2 and this is reflected in N1/N2, with skill-
specific unemployment rates constant, then the average wage paid will
rise by more than d log A+log (N1/N2)da - due to a compositional
effect.  But if d log a/(1-a)=d log (N1/N2)=d log (L1/L2) then the wage
within each skill group will rise by only d log A+log (N1/N2) da.  This
seems the natural definition of a neutral change in skill-specific wage
behaviour at given unemployment rates.
Mismatch
For some purposes we can usefully use a simpler decomposition
than that provided in equation (5).  When people ask: Is higher
8ad logW1% (1&a)d logW2'd logA% log
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unemployment due to increased skills mismatch, they do not mean to
include only the effect of d log B.  For suppose that wages have
adjusted through an appropriate change in relative wage pressure - for
example, an increase in B has been offset by an appropriate increase in
z1-z2.  Then there is no reason why aggregate unemployment should
rise.  Indeed that is just what happened in the US.  So when people
discuss mismatch they mean to include the full effects of the
“imbalance shock” and the “relative wage shock” which may have
offset it.  This would leave an aggregate wage shock as the main
alternative source of extra unemployment, since compositional effects
are small.
This suggests the following short-cut approach to the mismatch
issue, in which we do not identify separately the “imbalance shock”
and the “relative wage shock”.  Instead we identify changes in
“aggregate wage pressure” and label everything else a change in
mismatch.
We first note that, from the demand functions,
We then substitute for d log Wi by using the wage functions
which gives
Dividing through by ? and then adding d log u to both sides gives
9du' u
?
dz¯&d logA&log
N1
N2
da % &ad log
u1
u
& (1&a)d log
u2
u
u
'Aggregate wage pressure effect % Mismatch effect. (6)
The first term is the average excess rise in the wage function times u/?
(which reflects the degree of real wage resistence).  The term is
approximately equal to our previous measure of the effect of “aggregate
wage pressure” in equation (5).6  The second term is therefore close to
the sum of the other four terms in equation (5).  It is a natural measure
of mismatch and close to the measure of ½ d Var (ui/u) advocated by
Layard et al (1991)7 and now widely used.
In the empirical section we show such measures of the change in
mismatch in all the main European countries and in the US.  We also
show how these changes reflect the changes in employment and labour
force within each skill group.
2.   EVIDENCE ON EUROPE AND THE US
To examine the evidence, we split the labour force into two
groups, skilled and the rest, where skilled includes everyone with the
equivalent of English A levels or above (obtained around age 18).  In
Europe this is a fairly easy category to identify, while in the US we take
as the equivalent “some college”.8  In Annex 2 we give the basic time
series for L1/L2, N1/N2 and W1/W2 in each country.
Production function
The first step is to estimate the production function, pooling the
time series for all countries.  We assumed the production function to
be CES, which gives a demand function.9
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The estimated value of s  was 1.024 (s.e.=0.178).10  This is support for
the case of the Cobb-Douglas function.  We calculate a throughout as
the share of skilled labour in the total gross wage bill.
Wage functions
The next step is to estimate the wage functions.  This is done for
Britain (1975-92) and the US (1979-88) in Table 1.  In each country
the observations are average wages for each skill group in each region
(10 regions in Britain, 9 in the US).  The estimated equation is 
log Wsrt = a1D1t + a2D2t - ? log usrt + bQsrt + fixed effects for
s + fixed effects for r 
where W is the real gross wage (deflated by the GDP deflator), s is
skill, r region, t time, D1 and D2 dummies, and Q is a vector of quality
variables including average experience, experience squared, and the
proportions who are full-time, male, white, and in each ‘industry’.
Observations are weighted by the number of individuals in each cell.
The regression is done for average wages in each cell (rather than
for each individual) partly because these cells are the units relevant to
our theory and partly to avoid exaggerating the t-statistic on cell-
specific unemployment.  However the coefficient estimates obtained in
regressions on individual data are very similar, provided cell-specific
variables as well as individual variables are included as regressors.
As the analysis shows, time series movements in unemployment
offset real wages with a similar coefficient ? in the US and Britain.
However in Britain the time trends in the real wage intercept are very
similar for the two skill groups, while in the US they are much lower
for the unskilled.
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There is one further point stemming from the wage function.  The
quality (Qs) of each skill group is not static.  If a group’s quality
improves, so does its labour supply.  As Annex 2 explains, this requires
a modification of equations (3) and (4) to adjust the labour supply for
quality.  But the coefficients a in the theory can continue to be
measured exactly by the actual shares of the wage bill.11
Changes in unemployment.  Britain versus the US
We can now proceed in Table 2 to explain the changes in
unemployment over the sample period (UK 1975-92; US 1979-88).
The theory we have developed relates essentially to the NAIRU and
excludes nominal surprises.  However, since within a country the years
we have chosen are at similar points in the cycle, this is not a major
problem.
As Table 2 shows, British unemployment grew over the period by
5.9 percentage points.  To implement the explanatory framework set
out in Annex Equations A1-3, we evaluate the coefficients by taking
mean values of the variables that appear in each coefficient, evaluated
over the whole period.  One could of course perform the explanation
separately for each year and then add up, but our simpler
approximation works adequately.  The evaluation is done separately for
each region-and-skill group, and only then added up.
Overall, our model predicts that British unemployment grew by
5.5 points.  The model also explains quite well the growth of skilled
unemployment (by 3.5 points) and unskilled unemployment (by 7.5
points).  The main explanatory factors are these.
(i) Imbalanced demand and supply shocks.  In the labour market as
a whole the relative demand for labour grew strongly.  The relative
supply of skill grew almost (but not quite) as fast.  Thus over the period
12
This had the predicted effect of reducing skilled unemployment and
raising unskilled.  The net effect was an extra 0.7 points on overall
unemployment - not a very large amount.
(ii) Relative wage shocks.  Moreover some of the preceding effect
was offset by relative wage restraint among the unskilled.  Thus
increased skill mismatch offers little explanation of the rise in British
unemployment.
(iii) Aggregate wage pressure.  By far the main explanation comes
from increased wage pressure at a given unemployment rate - requiring
unemployment to rise in order to offset it.  This alone can explain the
otherwise unexplained rise in unemployment among skilled workers.
Such wage pressure is of course a pure catch-all.  For a proper
understanding of why unemployment rose we have to look in detail at
the impact of welfare systems, bargaining institutions, labour market
regulations, tax systems and so on.12  These issues have been discussed
at length elsewhere (Layard et al 1991).  But, to isolate the impact of
skills mismatch (as here), that is unnecessary.
(iv) The compositional effect.  This is in a downward direction, due
to the shift of the labour force into skill groups with lower
unemployment rates.  But it is a small part of the story.
Turning to the USA, there is little story to tell.  The evolution of
demand and supply was as imbalanced as in Britain.  But almost all of
this imbalance was offset by relative wage restraint in the unskilled
labour market.  The big difference from Britain was the absence of
aggregate wage pressure.  So aggregate unemployment barely changed.
Finally, while comparing Britain and the US, we can look at the
simpler decomposition given by equation (6).  This is shown in Table
3 and again attributes almost all the British increase in unemployment
to increased aggregate wage pressure rather than to Krugman’s
imbalanced supply and demand shocks, and the response to them.  The
13
story is highly consistent with the more detailed analysis in Table 2 and
thus provides us with some confidence in the short-cut approach.
Increased mismatch?  Europe versus the US
It is therefore interesting to use this approach (which requires less
data) to compare the USA with a wider range of European countries
and over a large time span.  As Table 4 shows, unemployment has risen
substantially in most European countries except the Netherlands.  But
in most countries none of the increase can be attributed to increased
mismatch, as measured in equation (6).  Only in Italy, Britain and the
US is there any explanation.  This reflects trends in u2/u1 - see Figure
1.
Why has there been no increase in mismatch in Europe?  It is due
to the massive change in the supply of skilled people.  Table 5 shows
the annual change in relative demand and relative supply (unadjusted
for “quality”).  The story is quite remarkable.  Both demand and supply
have shifted hugely.  In most countries the relative demand for skill has
slightly outrun supply.  But considering the size of the two changes, the
difference between them is remarkably small, as Column (3) shows.
The difference is particularly large in the US in the 1980s and also in
Britain which is doubtless one of the reasons for the strong upwards
pressure on skilled wages in the two countries.
The relative wage adjustment can be seen in Column (4).  It was
especially large in the US in the 1980s.  In most European countries it
was much less - but less wage adjustment was also needed, due to a
better process of skill development.
Thus the evidence suggests fairly powerfully that rigid relative
wages cannot be the main source of the rise in European
unemployment.  If they were the main reason, mismatch would have
increased; that is u2 /u1 would have risen.  It did not.
A natural reaction to this analysis is to say that we have not used
a fine enough division of skill.  However we also used a three-fold
breakdown of the labour force and applied it to a generalised version
of our model in which we continued to measure asymmetric shocks by
14
differences between d log a i/aN and d log Li/LN where N was a
numeraire group.  The results were very similar to those in Table 2.
A further objection is more subtle.  It rests on the undoubted fact
that in the US there has been an increase in wage dispersion within
skills, reflecting a widening premium for other types of productive
characteristics.  Suppose now that there is in Europe some arbitrary
cut-off to the permitted relative wage dispersion within each skill
group.  Then wage rigidities will increase the unemployment rates in
each group and may increase them by the same proportion.
The first comment on this is that it does not seem reasonable to
assume such a high binding wage floor in the skilled group.  But,
second, in most European countries there have in fact been very small
increases within group inequality.13  This could of course be simply a
symptom of total rigidity rather than just a wage floor.  But, if that were
it, there should be huge trend increases in reported shortages of
desirable labour, for which there is little evidence.
15
3.   CONCLUSIONS
Thus we cast severe doubt on the widely-held view that
unemployment rose in Europe, but not in America, due to less flexible
skill differentials.  The evidence in this paper says that the explanation
lies elsewhere.
First we develop a framework which can decompose changes in
skill-specific unemployment into changes due to (i) imbalanced
demand and supply changes, (ii) shocks to the relative wage behaviour
and (iii) changes in aggregate wage pressure.  This shows that, both in
the US and Europe, imbalanced demand and supply changes raised
unskilled unemployment and reduced skilled unemployment.  But
some of this effect was offset by appropriate shifts in relative wage
behaviour.  Thus, taking (i) and (ii) together, changes in skill mismatch
raised total unemployment in Britain since 1975 by under half a
percentage point, and in the US by even less.  The real difference
between Britain and the US was the rise in aggregate wage pressure in
Britain arising from the way in which the British economy was so
vulnerable to the oil and productivity shocks.14  It is this alone which
can explain the key fact about British and European unemployment -
that skilled unemployment has risen as much proportionally as
unskilled.  It is the total failure of the Krugman et al hypothesis to
explain this fact which renders it so implausible.
Thus if one constructs a simple measure of changes in mismatch,
corresponding roughly to the sum of items (i) and (ii) above, the only
countries where this has risen are the US, Britain and Italy.  In most of
the other European countries studied, it has fallen.  In the 1980s wage
differentials have increased much less in Europe than in the US, but
they needed to increase less because the rate of skill formation was so
much higher in Europe.
While our analysis is quite limited, it surely calls in question the
view that European unemployment rose because of increased relative
demand for skill, interacting with rigid relative wages.  There was
simply not the fall in unemployment of skilled workers which the
16
theory predicts.15  Instead we have to look above all at explanations
based on the European welfare state and its effect on all groups of
labour.
17
1. For other discussions of US and European wage dispersion and
its correlates see Freeman and Katz (1994) and the collection of
papers in Freeman and Katz (1995).  See also Juhn et al (1993).
2. Note that (1&a)d log a
1&a
' (1&a) 1
a
%
1
1&a
d a 'd loga.
3. This form is well-supported by much evidence, especially in
Europe - see for example Layard et al (1991) and Blanchflower
and Oswald (1994).
4. Nickell and Bell (1995), Manning et al. (1996).
5. In this case
dW
W
'
1
W
N1
N
dW1%
N2
N
dW2
'ad logW1% (1&a)d logW2
Furthermore from the two labour demand functions we know that
(whatever happens to N1/N2 ),
ad logW1% (1&a)d logW2'd logA% log
N1
N2
da.
6. If u1=u2 the two measures are identical (see Annex 1).  But when
u1  u2, the coefficient in equation (5) is less than u/? because the
aggregate wage shock leads to a fall in the dispersion of the
relative unemployment rates (see also Nickell and Bell, 1995).
The difference however is not large if say u1=½ u2.
7. The measure in Layard et al (1991) is -ud (a log u1/u + (1-a) log
u2/u).  The present measure is more logical.  The previous
ENDNOTES
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measure equals the present measure plus (-log u2/u1 da).  This
may be positive or negative but in our sample of countries is
negative (with da > 0 and u2 > u1).
8. We do the same for Spain since the available classification
provides no clearer breakpoint.
9. This corresponds to the production function
withY'A(a1N
?
1 %a2N
?
2 )
1
? ,
a1
a2
s
'e ßt.const.
10. For separate regressions done for Britain and the US using lagged
W1/W2 as an instrument, the estimates of s  were 1.13 (s.e.=0.19)
and 1.74 (s.e.=0.64 respectively).
11. d log A is calculated as d log A=d log WN- d (a1 log N1X1) - d(a2
log N2 X2) where Xi is defined in Annex 3.
12. The best explanation of rising European unemployment is in
terms of an economic system that worked alright if not shocked,
but was fragile in the face of shocks - leading to the emergence of
behaviour unfriendly to employment.  Thus across countries we
have ? u related to the level of institutional variables.
13. See OECD, Employment Outlook, 1993, p.162.
14. In addition incomes policy which had helped to contain wage
pressure from 1975-9 was abandoned in 1979.
15. This does not mean that the level of mismatch is not an important
issue in both Europe and America, see Layard et al (1991,
Chapter 6, p.310).
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ANNEX 1
Deriving equation (5)
We first solve for du1 and du2, using equations (3') and (4').  This
gives
(A.1)
du1'M
?(1&a)
u2
d logB
%
au2%?(1&u2)
u2(1&u2)
(dz1&d z¯ )%
1&a
1&u2
(dz2&d z¯ )
%
au2%?(1&u2)% (1&a)u2
u2(1&u2)
d AWP
where M'
u1u2(1&u1)(1&u2)
?(?(1&u1)(1&u2)%au2% (1&a)u1&u1u2)
>0
Similarly,
(A.2)
du2'M &
?a
u1
d logB
%
a
1&u1
(d z1&d z¯ )%
(1&a)u1%?(1&u1)
u1(1&u1)
(d z2&d z¯ )
%
(1&a)u1%?(1&u1)%au1
u1(1&u1)
d AWP
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u2(1&u2)
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u1
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u2
d logB
% R
au2%?(1&u2)
u2(1&u2)
% (1&R) a
1&u1
(dz1&d z¯ )
% (1&R)
(1&a)u1%?(1&u1)
u1(1&u1)
% R 1&a
1&u2
(dz2&d z¯ )
% (1&R)
(1&a)u1%?(1&u1)%au1
u1(1&u1)
d AWP
% (u1&u2)dR (A.3)
Aggregate unemployment is given by The change inu'u1
L1
L
%u2
L2
L
unemployment is therefore
ordu' Rdu1%(1&R)du2%(u1&u2)dR, with R'
L1
L
,
Note that, in the case where the coefficient on d AWP isu1'u2'u,
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u 2(1&u)2
?(?(1&u)2%u&u 2)
l au% ?(1&u)% (1&a)u
u(1&u)
%(1&l) (1&a)u% ?(1&u)% au
u(1&u)
'
u 2(1&u)2
?(?(1&u)2%u&u 2)
u% ?(1&u)
u(1&u)
'
u(1&u)(u%?(1&u))
?(1&u)(u% ?(1&u))
'
u
?
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ANNEX 2
Basic data
23
24
United States
Sources: Available on request.
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logWs'ast&?logus%bQs% regional dummies.
logW1&logX1'z1(t)&?logu1 (A.1)
Y'A(N1X1)
a (N2X2)
1&a
ANNEX 3
Adjustment for “quality”
To make a satisfactory analysis of the race between demand and
supply, we have to control for the fact that workers vary in “quality”
not only according to skill but also experience, experience2, full-
time/part-time, sex and race.  Call this vector Q, which affects the wage
of skill groups according to
where Ws is the average real wage per person.
We can for convenience designate bQs by the expression log Xs.
It follows that the wage equation for skill group 1 has to be re-written
as
The demand function for persons in skill group 1 also has to be
rewritten to allow for quality.  Suppose the true production function
is
where N1 X1 is measured in efficiency units.  The demand for an
efficiency unit of skill group 1 is then
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logW1& logX1' logA% loga& (1&a)log
N1X1
N2X2
' logA% loga& (1&a)log
N1X1
L1X1
% (1&a)log
N2X2
L2X2
& (1&a)log
L1X1
L2X2
' logA% loga& (1&a)log(1&u1)% (1&a) log(1&u2)& (1&a)log
L1X1
L2X2 (A.2)
du1' f 1(1&a) d log
L1X1
L2X2
&d log a
1&a
% f 1 dz1&d logA& log
N1X1
N2X2
da % f 1(1&a)
du2
1&u2
Combining (A.1) and (A.2) gives a new version of equation (3) in
which changes in labour supply have to be modified to allow for
changes in quality - and the ratio N1/N2 must also be modified.  The
new equation is
We make these modifications to and wherever wed log
L1
L2
log
N1
N2
“allow for quality”.
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TABLE 1
Wage equation
Dependent variable: log of average real region-skill-specific wage
Britain US
log usrt -.0302 (4.4) -.0363 (2.3)
D1 t
D2 t
.0195
.0191
(13.3)
(15.5)
-.0054
-.0120
(1.5)
(4.4)
D2
(unskilled)
-.4346 (10.5) -.3048 (4.2)
Average
experience .0336 (3.1) .0513 (2.5)
(Average
experience)2 -.0004 (1.9) -.0014 (2.7)
Proportion
full-time .7148 (6.4) .8846 (2.8)
Proportion
male .2640 (2.1) .0823 (.4)
Other
variables
Race
% in each industry (7)
Regional dummies (9)
Race
% in each industry (12)
Regional dummies (8)
N
R22
357
.976
162
.980
Dates 1975-92 1979-83, 1985-88
Source of data: UK General Household Survey.  Approx 10,000 individuals
per year.
US CPS March outgoing rotation groups.  20% random
sample within each gender-education cell.  Result: 30,000
individuals per year?
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TABLE 2A
Decomposing the change in unemployment rates (percentage points)
Britain 1975-92
Skilled Unskilled Total
Imbalanced
D+S shocks -1.05 1.28 0.71
Relative wage
shocks 0.05 -0.34 -0.27
Aggregate wage
shock 5.02 6.29 5.98
Compositional
change 0.05 -0.12 -0.97
Total explained 3.96 7.11 5.46
Actual 3.47 7.50 5.90
TABLE 2B
Decomposing the change in unemployment rates (percentage points)
USA 1979-88
Skilled Unskilled Total
Imbalanced
D+S shocks -0.60 1.65 0.66
Relative wage
shocks 0.50 -1.36 -0.54
Aggregate wage
shock -0.11 -0.15 -0.14
Compositional
change -0.05 -0.10 -0.33
Total explained -0.27 0.04 -0.36
Actual -0.07 0.27 -0.05
Note: The compositional change includes shifts in the composition of workers
between regions as well as between skill groups.
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TABLE 3
Decomposing the change in aggregate unemployment: simplified approach 
(percentage points)
Britain (1975-92) US (1979-88)
Mismatch shock
Aggregate wage shock
0.14
6.87
0.05
-0.16
      Total explained 7.01 -0.11
      Actual 5.90 -0.05
Note: Both the first two rows are independently calculated, using (6).
TABLE 4
Change in aggregate unemployment: simplified approach 
(percentage points)
Country Period Change due to
mismatch
Total change
USA.
Britain
France
Italy
Netherlands
Norway
Sweden
Australia
Canada
70-91
75-92
78-94
77-93
75-93
72-93
71-93
79-93
75-93
-
.01
-
-
-0.2
-0.3
-0.1
-0.1
-0.1
1.4
5.9
7.3
3.3
2.3
4.0
5.8
5.0
4.3
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TABLE 5
Annual change in relative demand and relative supply
All variables have been multiplied by 100
Years dlog
(a/(1-a))
(1)
dlog
(L1/L2)
(2)
(1)-(2)
(3)
dlog
(W1/W2)
(4)
dlog
(N1/N2)
(5)
(5)-(2)
(6)
USA 70-89
70-79
80-89
5.24
5.67
4.60
4.59
6.77
3.21
0.65
-0.90
1.39
0.50
-1.26
1.35
4.74
6.93
3.25
0.15
0.26
0.04
Britain 74-92 7.55 6.82 0.73 0.52 7.03 0.21
France 84-93 6.51 6.09 0.42 0.22 6.29 0.20
Italy 77-92 6.52 6.27 0.25 -0.14 6.66 0.29
Nether-
lands 85-90 5.34 5.92 -0.58 -0.15 5.49 -0.43
Norway 79-93 6.25 6.16 0.09 -0.15 6.40 -0.14
Spain 77-93 5.05 5.58 0.53
Sweden 71-93 7.17 6.84 0.33 0.32 6.85 0.01
Australia 79-90 5.49 5.01 0.48 0.39 5.10 0.09
Canada 79-93 5.85 5.49 0.36 0.39 5.46 -0.03
Note: Column (6) is approximately equal to 100 (du2 - du1).
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FIGURE 1
Relative unemployment rates (unskilled/skilled, i.e. u2/u1)
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